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HOW CONGRESS COULD DEFEND DOMA 
IN COURT (AND WHY THE BLAG 
CANNOT) 
Matthew I. Hall* 
In one of the most closely watched litigation matters in recent years, the 
Supreme Court will soon consider Edith Windsor's challenge to the Defense of 
Marriage Act (DOMA). The Court surprised many observers by granting certi-
orari, not only on the merits of Windsor's equal protection and due process 
claims, but also on the question whether the defendants—the United States and 
the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the House of Representatives (the 
BLAG)—have Article III standing to defend DOMA. The United States has 
agreed with plaintiffs that DOMA is unconstitutional, prompting the BLAG to 
intervene for the purpose of defending DOMA’s constitutionality. No lower 
court has yet addressed whether the BLAG has standing, so the Supreme Court 
will have the first crack at the issue. But it turns out that the answer is straight-
forward: Under settled precedent, the BLAG lacks authority to represent either 
the United States or Congress, and having claimed no interest of its own, it 
therefore lacks Article III standing. If the Court so holds—as it should—its de-
cision will have repercussions for Edith Windsor and dozens of other litigants 
with DOMA cases pending in lower federal courts. And the Court’s handling of 
the standing question may also have enduring significance for the law of legis-
lative standing and constitutional separation of powers. 
BACKGROUND 
Dr. Thea Speyer died in 2009, leaving a substantial estate to her spouse, 
Ms. Edith Windsor. Speyer and Windsor had been partners for nearly thirty-
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five years at the time of Speyer's death, and New York law recognized them as 
legally married. Had Windsor been married to a man, the bequest would have 
been exempt from federal estate taxes under the Internal Revenue Code’s 
“spousal exemption.” But because section 3 of DOMA provides that the term 
“spouse” for federal law purposes excludes members of same sex couples,
1
 
Windsor was required to pay over $363,000 in federal estate tax. She paid the 
tax and sued for a refund on the ground that DOMA's definition of spouse is 
unconstitutional. 
Many litigants have challenged DOMA since it was enacted in 1996, and 
the federal government consistently defended the statute’s constitutionality un-
til February 23, 2011. On that date, Attorney General Eric Holder announced a 
shift in policy. The Administration had concluded, Holder said, “that classifica-
tions based on sexual orientation warrant heightened scrutiny,” and that “Sec-
tion 3 of DOMA is unconstitutional under that standard.” Accordingly, Holder 
announced that “the President has instructed the Department not to defend the 
statute” in Windsor and other cases, and that DOJ would notify the courts “of 
our interest in providing Congress a full and fair opportunity to participate in 
the litigation in those cases.”2  
House Speaker John Boehner swiftly declared his intention to convene the 
BLAG to consider how the House should proceed. House Rule II.8 creates the 
BLAG and authorizes it to “consult” with the Speaker concerning litigation in 
which the House’s interests are implicated.
3
 In April 2011, Boehner announced 
that the BLAG itself would defend DOMA in court.4 The BLAG hired former 
Solicitor General Paul Clement as counsel, and promptly filed briefs in several 
pending cases, seeking permission for the BLAG to intervene “for the limited 
purpose of defending the constitutionality of Section III” of DOMA.5  
 
 1. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 
1 U.S.C. § 7 (2011) and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2011)). Section 3 of DOMA defines “spouse” to 
mean only “a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.” Id. 
 2. Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen. of the United States, to John Boehner, 
Speaker of the U.S. House of Reps. (Feb. 23, 2011), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-223.html. 
 3. RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS, at 
Rule II.8 (2011), available at http://www.rules.house.gov/singlepages.aspx? 
NewsID=160&rsbd=165. The BLAG is composed of five members of the House leadership: 
the Speaker, the Majority and Minority Leaders, and the Majority and Minority Whips. See 
Press Release, Congressman John Boehner, Regarding the Defense of Marriage Act (Mar. 4, 
2011), available at http://boehner.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx? 
DocumentID=227399. 
 4. Letter from John Boehner, Speaker of the House of Representatives, to Nancy 
Pelosi, House Minority Leader (Apr. 18, 2011), available at http://boehner.house.gov/ 
news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=237443. 
 5. Memorandum of Points and Authorities In Support of Unopposed Motion of the 
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the U.S. House of Representatives to Intervene for a 
Limited Purpose at 4, Windsor v. United States, No. 10-civ-8435 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2011). 
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In most of the cases in which the BLAG sought to intervene, the plaintiffs 
and the Department of Justice did not oppose the motion, and the courts permit-
ted the BLAG to become a party.
6
 In Edith Windsor’s case, the federal trial 
court permitted the BLAG to intervene, and later invalidated section 3 of 
DOMA. The Second Circuit affirmed in October 2012. Both the BLAG and the 
DOJ attorneys representing the United States petitioned for certiorari, and the 
Supreme Court agreed to review Ms. Windsor’s case on December 7, 2012. 
The Court is now expected to resolve once and for all the question of DOMA's 
constitutionality—but only if it reaches the merits. And that may not happen. 
The Court signaled its concern about jurisdiction by granting certiorari not only 
on the merits of Windsor's constitutional claims, but also on the jurisdictional 
issue of “whether the [BLAG] has Article III standing in this case.”
7
 Although 
this question has attracted some scholarly attention,
8
 it has generated no discus-
sion by the lower courts that have considered DOMA’s constitutionality. The 
Court's grant of certiorari on the standing question promises to change that. 
 
 6. In at least two cases, McLaughlin v. Panetta, and Dragovich v. United States 
Deptartment of the Treasury, the plaintiffs did object to the BLAG’s intervention. See, e.g., 
Plaintiffs’ Opposition to the Motion for Leave to Intervene, McLaughlin v. Panetta, No. 11-
11905 (D. Mass. May 9, 2012); Plaintiffs’ Opposition to the Motion of the Bipartisan Legal 
Advisory Group’s Motion to Intervene, Dragovich v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 764 F. 
Supp. 2d 1178, No. 10-01564 (N.D. Cal. May 10, 2011). In Windsor and other cases, 
however, no such opposition was mounted. As a doctrinal matter, the plaintiff’s 
acquiescence is beside the point, because the question of the BLAG’s standing is 
jurisdictional, and thus cannot be waived. 
 7. See Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 2012 
WL 4009654 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2012) (No. 12-307). The Court also granted certiorari on the 
question of the standing of the United States, phrasing the issue as “Whether the Executive 
Branch's agreement with the court below that DOMA is unconstitutional deprives this Court 
of jurisdiction to decide this case.” Id. That question is beyond the scope of this Essay.  
 8. See, e.g., Matthew I. Hall, Standing of Intervenor-Defendants in Public Law 
Litigation, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1539 (2012); Tara L. Grove & Neal Devins, Why Congress 
Cannot Represent Itself in Court (2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); see 
also Amanda Frost, Congress in Court, 59 UCLA L. Rev. 914 (2012); Abner S. Greene, 
Interpretive Schizophrenia: How Congressional Standing Can Solve The Enforce-But-Not-
Defend Problem, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 577 (Nov. 2012); Joseph Landau, The President And 
The Passive Virtues: Executive Branch Constitutionalism and Individual Rights (2013) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); Howard M. Wasserman, Rejecting Sovereign 
Immunity in Public Law Litigation, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. Res Gestae 76 (2012), available at 
http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/res_gestae/13. Cf. Linda Greenhouse, Standing and Delivering, 
N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR (Dec. 12, 2012, 9:00 PM), 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/12/standing-and-delivering (noting that “the 
procedural minefield the court has laid around these cases may hold implications reaching 
well beyond the domain of gay rights—for the relationship of states to their citizens and for 
the balance of power between the president and Congress.”). 
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THE BLAG LACKS ARTICLE III STANDING TO DEFEND DOMA 
Article III’s limitations on federal jurisdiction apply to legislators and leg-
islative institutions just as surely as they apply to other litigants. In particular, 
legislative litigants must establish “standing” by showing that they have a per-
sonal stake in the outcome of a case.
9
 In seeking to intervene in Windsor and 
other DOMA cases, the BLAG has not claimed to possess an interest of its own 
in defending DOMA; rather, it has professed to represent: (1) the interest of the 
United States in defending a federal law when the executive has “abdicated 
[his] constitutional responsibility” to do so, and (2) the interest of the House of 
Representatives “in defending the constitutionality of its legislative handi-
work.”
10
 Neither of these rationales can support standing for the BLAG. First, 
under settled law Congress lacks authority to assert the interests of the United 
States in litigation unless authorized by statute—and no statute permits Con-
gress or the BLAG to defend challenged federal statutes in general, or DOMA 
in particular. Second, the Court has held that legislative committees such as the 
BLAG may not assert the interests of a chamber of Congress without explicit 
authorization from that chamber. Here, the House has not made any determina-
tion to defend DOMA and has not delegated to the BLAG (or to the Speaker) 
authority to make that decision for it. Thus, under controlling principles of law, 
the BLAG has no right to bring the Windsor case before the Supreme Court. 
The BLAG May Not Litigate on Behalf of the United States Because It Lacks 
Statutory Authorization 
One theory on which the BLAG has sought to establish standing is that it is 
asserting the interest of the United States itself. The United States certainly 
possesses an interest in defending any challenged federal law,
11
 but the authori-
ty to assert the interests of the United States in Court is granted by statute to the 
Department of Justice, and not to the BLAG or to Congress. The relevant pro-
vision is 28 U.S.C. § 516, which provides that: 
 
 9. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819 (1997); cf. Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 62 
(1986) (stating that the power to invoke judicial authority “is not to be placed in the hands of 
concerned bystanders who will use it simply as a vehicle for the vindication of value 
interests.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 10. See, e.g., Motion for Leave to Intervene of the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of 
the U.S. House of Representatives at 12, Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t. of HHS 682 F.3d 1 
(1st Cir. 2012) (No. 10-2204, 10-2207, & 10-2214) (asserting that “in light of the 
Department’s refusal to [defend DOMA] the House should be allowed to intervene to 
discharge that function.”); see also Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
Motion of the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group For Leave to Intervene at 13, McLaughlin v. 
Panetta, (No. 11-11905) (D. Mass. May 1, 2012); id. at 9 (“The House . . . has a direct 
interest in defending the constitutionality of its legislative handiwork . . . .”). 
 11. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. 2403(a) (2011); Hall, supra note 8, at 1576-79; cf. Diamond, 
476 U.S. at 62 (“a State has standing to defend the constitutionality of its statute.”). 
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Except as otherwise provided by law, the conduct of litigation in which the 
United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party, or is interested, and se-
curing evidence therefore, is reserved to officers of the Department of Justice, 
under the direction of the Attorney General. 
As the first clause makes clear, section 516 does two things: First, it grants 
authority to represent the United States to the DOJ. Second, it expressly prohib-
its anyone else from representing the United States unless “otherwise provided 
by law.” Unfortunately for the BLAG, there is no provision anywhere in the 
United States Code that authorizes the BLAG to represent the United States in 
defending a federal statute. The BLAG cites no statutory authority for its 
claimed standing to represent the United States—and none exists. For this sim-
ple reason, section 516 is fatal to the BLAG’s claim of standing to assert the 
interests of the United States.
12
 
Lacking statutory authority to litigate on behalf of the United States, the 
BLAG seeks to invoke INS v. Chadha for the proposition that “Congress is the 
proper party to defend the validity of a statute when an agency of government, 
as a defendant charged with enforcing the statute, agrees with plaintiffs that the 
statute is inapplicable or unconstitutional.”
13
 But Chadha did not hold, as the 
BLAG suggests, that Congress may represent the United States whenever it 
perceives that the executive branch is “abdicating” its responsibility to defend a 
particular piece of legislation. Rather, it permitted Congress to assert its own 
institutional interests by defending a statute that implicated the balance of pow-
er between Congress and the President. Chadha concerned the constitutionality 
of the legislative veto, a statute that increased Congress’s power at the expense 
of the executive branch. The Court noted that the challenge to the statute put 
the executive and legislative branches in direct conflict and that Congress 
therefore had a stake in the outcome and was a proper party to defend the stat-
ute.
14
 The fact that the statute affected the allocation of power between Con-
gress and the executive branch was central to the Court’s reasoning in Chadha, 
and is entirely lacking here. In short, because the narrow institutional-role ex-
ception laid down in Chadha is inapplicable here, our law requires statutory au-
thorization for a chamber of Congress or its delegate to represent the United 
States in litigation. No such authorization exists with respect to DOMA.  
The BLAG May Not Litigate on Behalf of the House of Representatives Without 
 
 12. See Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 366 F. 
Supp. 51, 56 n.8 (D.D.C. 1973) (holding that section 516 is satisfied only by a statute, and 
not by a resolution of a single chamber of Congress). 
 13. See Motion for Leave to Intervene, supra note 10, at 13 (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 
U.S. 919, 940 (1983)).  
 14. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 930 n.5, 937-939 (1983); see also Raines, 521 
U.S. at 826, 828-29 (construing Chadha narrowly); Hall, supra note 8, at 1547-49. 
Moreover, in Chadha, the House and Senate formally voted to intervene. See 462 U.S. at 
923-28. As discussed below, the same is not true here. 
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That Chamber’s Explicit Authorization 
An alternative theory on which the BLAG premises its claim of standing is 
that it is representing not the United States as a whole, but the House of Repre-
sentatives insofar as it has an interest in defending its legislative handiwork. 
The problem with this argument is that, even assuming that Congress has an 
interest in defending any challenged federal law, the Supreme Court has con-
sistently held that components of Congress—such as individual members or 
committees—may not assert Congress’s institutional interests in federal litiga-
tion unless authorized to do so by a full chamber vote. This requirement of full-
chamber authorization protects the separation of powers by ensuring that litiga-
tion positions purportedly taken on Congress’s behalf are actually “desired by 
Congress,” and promotes democratic accountability by ensuring that the House 
and Senate are not “insulated” from responsibility for the conduct of their 
agents.
15
 
In Raines v. Byrd, for instance, the Court rejected an effort by individual 
legislators to assert the institutional interests of their respective chambers. In 
Raines, individual members of Congress challenged the Line Item Veto Act on 
constitutional grounds, alleging that the Act injured them by diluting the effec-
tiveness of their votes on spending and taxation bills. The Court noted that the 
plaintiffs had alleged no personal injury, but only an institutional one, observ-
ing that “If [plaintiffs] were to retire tomorrow, [they] would no longer have a 
claim; the claim would be possessed by [their] successors instead.” The Court 
denied standing to assert this institutional interest, emphasizing that Congress 
itself had not sought judicial intervention, and holding that no suit to vindicate 
an institutional interest of the Congress could take place without authorization 
by the full chamber.
16
 
The BLAG’s counsel, Paul Clement, is well aware of this line of cases. In-
deed, while employed in the executive branch, he relied on it to assert a far nar-
rower view of legislative standing than he now asserts on behalf of the BLAG. 
In Walker v. Cheney, the Comptroller General (an agent of Congress) requested 
 
 15. See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 201, 205 (1957); see also, e.g., 
Raines, 521 U.S. at 829 (rejecting the plaintiffs’ claim of legislative standing, and 
“attach[ing] some importance” to the fact that plaintiffs were not authorized to assert the 
interests of their respective chambers); Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 
534, 544 (1986) (“Generally speaking, members of collegial bodies do not have standing to 
perfect an appeal the body itself has declined to take.”); United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 
7 (1892) (“The two houses of Congress are legislative bodies representing larger 
constituencies. Power is not vested in any one individual, but in the aggregate of the 
members who compose the body . . . .”). 
 16. Raines, 521 U.S. at 814, 821, 829; see also id. at 829 & n.10 (noting that appellees 
had alleged no individual injury, and had not been authorized by their respective chambers to 
assert the institutional interests thereof; further citing Bender, 475 U.S. at 544, and Ballin, 
144 U.S. at 7 for the proposition that legislative bodies must generally act collectively in 
seeking judicial review). 
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documents from Vice President Dick Cheney as part of a congressional investi-
gation. The Vice President refused to produce some of those documents, lead-
ing to a suit by the Comptroller General, who alleged institutional injury to 
Congress. Then-Deputy Solicitor General Clement’s brief in support of the 
Vice President’s successful motion to dismiss argued that “[w]hile Raines left 
open the question of whether Congress itself could bring suit for institutional 
injuries through a majority vote of its members (or the members of one cham-
ber), it makes clear that anything short of such collective action does not satisfy 
Article III.”
17
  
As Mr. Clement argued in Walker v. Cheney, according standing to a pur-
ported agent of Congress without explicit authorization by the full chamber 
would be contrary to established Article III standing doctrine. Mr. Clement ar-
gued that the Comptroller General was “simply acting as a surrogate for two 
individual members of Congress, purportedly to vindicate an institutional Leg-
islative Branch interest.” In such circumstances, he explained, any claim of 
standing is foreclosed by Article III: “As in Raines, neither House of Congress 
has authorized any action on behalf of either the Senate or the House. Raines 
thus makes clear that individual Members of Congress cannot assert Congress’s 
institutional interests.”
18
 
The BLAG’s effort to defend DOMA on Congress’s behalf is not meaning-
fully different from the Comptroller General’s failed attempt to assert Con-
gress’s institutional interest in Walker v. Cheney. Although the BLAG claims to 
be representing the House, that chamber has never authorized the BLAG to de-
fend DOMA. The House Rule that created the BLAG endows it only with the 
authority to “consult with the Speaker” concerning the conduct of litigation in 
which the House is involved. There is no House Rule or House Resolution 
granting the BLAG (or the Speaker) a general authority to prosecute litigation 
on the House’s behalf, and the House has not adopted a resolution authorizing a 
legal defense of DOMA by the BLAG (or by the Speaker, or by anyone else). 
Indeed, the only members of Congress who have voted to authorize DOMA’s 
 
 17. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant’s Motion to 
Dismiss and in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 15-16, Walker v. 
Cheney, 230 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 2002) (No. 02-340), 2002 WL 32388017 [hereinafter 
Vice President’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities] (emphasis added). Compare id. at 
14-16 (arguing that Raines requires a full chamber vote authorizing the assertion of 
Congress’s institutional interest) with Motion for Leave to Intervene, supra note 10, at 5, 14-
17 (arguing that the House has an institutional interest in defending DOMA and that the 
BLAG can assert that interest without a full chamber vote). For a thorough and insightful 
discussion of these issues see Plaintiffs’ Opposition to the Motion of the BLAG for Leave to 
Intervene at 12, McLaughlin v. Panetta, No. 11-11905 (D. Mass. May 9, 2012).  
 18. Vice President’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities, supra note 17, at 14-15 
(emphasis added). 
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legal defense are the three Republican Representatives who serve on the five-
member BLAG.
19
 
Despite these facts, the BLAG has assured the courts that it is acting pursu-
ant to specific authorization by the House, stating that “the House has formally 
determined to defend [DOMA].”
20
 But this assertion is simply false—a point 
made clear by the fact that the only authority the BLAG is able to cite for this 
alleged “formal” authorization is a press release issued by the Speaker’s office, 
indicating that three members of the BLAG voted to authorize the defense of 
DOMA. Whatever else this press release and the vote it reports might be, they 
do not constitute a “formal” determination—of anything at all—by the House 
itself. The BLAG cites no House Resolution or other determination by the full 
chamber to defend DOMA, because none exists.  
In short, whatever may be Congress’s constitutional authority to participate 
in litigation to defend a federal statute, the Court has consistently required at 
least that a chamber of Congress itself must exercise that authority—and nei-
ther the House nor the Congress as a whole has done so with respect to DOMA. 
With neither an interest of its own nor authority to assert the House’s purported 
interest, the BLAG simply has no right to defend DOMA. 
CONCLUSION  
The BLAG’s effort to defend DOMA raises thorny separation of powers 
questions about the power of Congress, or a component of Congress, to choose 
to defend federal laws in the face of executive non-defense. There may come a 
time when the Court must address those larger questions, but now is not that 
time because the BLAG is not authorized to speak for the United States or for 
Congress. Even assuming that the separation of powers permits legislative de-
fense of statutes, the BLAG cannot defend DOMA, because of two controlling 
principles: First, the BLAG lacks statutory authorization to represent the inter-
ests of the United States itself, as required by 28 U.S.C. section 516. Second, 
even if the House itself could defend DOMA, it has not authorized the BLAG 
to do so. The Supreme Court permits congressional litigants to assert the insti-
tutional interests of Congress only upon a full chamber vote, and Congress has 
taken no action to authorize the BLAG to defend DOMA on its behalf. Thus, 
 
 19. See Jill Jackson, House GOP Moves to Defend DOMA, CBS NEWS (March 4, 
2011, 5:04 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20039457-503544.html. In 
contrast, over 140 members of the House have joined an amicus brief filed in Windsor and 
other DOMA cases indicating that the BLAG “does not speak for a unanimous House.” See 
Brief of Members of the U.S. House of Representatives—Including Objecting Members of 
the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group—As Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiff-Appellee 
and Urging Affirmance at 1, Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012), 2012 
WL 4338882. Notably, even the BLAG has not contended that the Speaker alone may 
unilaterally initiate litigation to assert the House’s institutional interests. 
 20. Motion for Leave to Intervene, supra note 10, at 5.  
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the BLAG has no authority under federal statutes, House rules, or House reso-
lutions to participate in the Windsor case on behalf of either the United States 
or the House.  
Congress could solve these problems by statute or resolution, but until it 
does so the BLAG is a mere bystander, with no stake in defending DOMA. 
This lack of standing may play a decisive role in the Windsor litigation. Both 
the BLAG and the executive branch defendants appealed the District Court’s 
judgment to the Second Circuit, and petitioned the Supreme Court for certiora-
ri. If the BLAG lacks standing, however, then it had no authority to appeal or to 
seek Supreme Court review, and the Court’s jurisdiction must turn on whether 
the United States, which has agreed with the plaintiff that DOMA is unconstitu-
tional, has standing to proceed with the case. Interestingly, the BLAG itself has 
argued that no such standing exists—a controversial position that is beyond the 
scope of this short piece. But if the BLAG is correct, then there is no case or 
controversy before the Court, and the Court will have to dismiss for lack of ju-
risdiction. The widespread expectation that Windsor will be a significant deci-
sion appears to be well-founded. But it remains to be seen whether its signifi-
cance will lie in the area of individual rights or in the areas of federal court 
jurisdiction and the separation of powers. 
 
Author’s Note, February 1, 2013 
When the BLAG intervened in April 2011, appealed in July 2012, and ul-
timately petitioned for certiorari in December 2012, it claimed to act on behalf 
of the House of Representatives, an assertion that necessarily referred to the 
House of Representatives of the 112th Congress. We know this because the 
House of Representatives is not a continuing body, and each Congress adopts 
its Rules and constitutes its committees (including the BLAG) anew.
21
 Thus, 
the BLAG that acted during the 112th Congress (from January 3, 2011 to Janu-
ary 3, 2013) was constituted by the 112th Congress, and possessed only the au-
thority granted to it by that Congress. As I argued in the Essay, that authority 
did not include the power to assert the interest of the House in defending 
DOMA.  
A few commentators have inquired whether a recent factual develop-
ment—the new 113th Congress’s adoption of a resolution authorizing the 
BLAG to defend the constitutionality of section 3 of DOMA—affects my anal-
ysis of BLAG’s standing. With respect to the Windsor case, the answer is no, 
for the simple reason that the BLAG’s intervention, appeal, and petition for cer-
 
 21. See Gojack v. United States, 384 U.S. 702, 706 n. 4 (1966) (“[A]uthorization of a 
[Committee’s actions] must occur during the term of the Congress in which the [action] 
takes place. Neither the House of Representatives nor its committees are continuing bodies. 
It is the practice of the House to adopt its Rules—including the Rule which establishes [its 
committees] and defines the scope of [their] authority—at the beginning of each Congress.” 
(citations omitted)). 
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tiorari were all taken during the 112th Congress, when the BLAG’s only lawful 
authority was to “consult” with the Speaker concerning the directions to be giv-
en to the General Counsel of the House regarding litigation in which the House 
was involved. House Rule II.8 under the 112th Congress gave the BLAG no 
power to intervene in litigation on its own behalf, or to represent the House’s 
interests in court, and the House during the 112th Congress never granted the 
BLAG any additional authority to defend DOMA.  
Accordingly, as I wrote in the Essay, the BLAG’s assertion in court filings 
that the House had “formally determined to defend DOMA” was false. Stand-
ing is assessed at the outset of the case, and standing to appeal requires the ap-
pellant to show that it is aggrieved by the judgment appealed from. The 112th 
Congress’s expiration without the House having authorized a defense of 
DOMA makes it impossible to conclude that the House was aggrieved at the 
relevant times.
22
 Only after the Supreme Court had raised, in its grant of certio-
rari, concerns about the BLAG’s standing, did the 113th Congress hastily at-
tempt to paper over the defective foundation for the BLAG’s standing. But the 
113th Congress can no more give retroactive validation to the BLAG’s actions 
during the 112th Congress than it can authorize the BLAG or other committees 
to act during the 114th Congress.
23
  
This is not to say that the BLAG may not participate in merits briefing in 
Windsor as amicus curiae. And if section 3 of DOMA is not struck down in 
Windsor, and the BLAG seeks to intervene, to appeal, or to petition for certio-
rari in other cases on behalf of the House of Representatives of the 113th Con-
gress, it will at least be able to claim the full authority of the House of Repre-
sentatives. But as matters stand today, the BLAG has not validly petitioned for 
certiorari on behalf of the House of Representatives.
24
  
 
 22. See Brief of Court-Appointed Amica Curiae Addressing Jurisdiction at 18, United 
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Finally, it bears mentioning that even if the House of Representatives of 
the 113th Congress has conferred authority on the BLAG to assert its interests, 
it remains far from clear that those interests are sufficient to support Article III 
standing. As I discuss in the Essay, there is no authority for the proposition that 
Congress has standing to defend run-of-the-mill federal statutes when the exec-
utive has declined to do so. The only authority the BLAG points to—INS v. 
Chadha—is readily distinguishable, because the statute there directly affected 
Congressional prerogatives. And even if the Court were prepared to recognize 
that Congress has standing to defend a law like DOMA, it is not clear that the 
House acting alone can assert Congress’ interest without the Senate’s concur-
rence.
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